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Military Expenditure, Industrialisation, and Economic Growth in 
Africa: Evidence from a Panel Causality Analysis  
Abstract 
Considerable analysis has focused on the causal relationship between military expenditure and 
economic growth in literature. However, the causality relationship to industrialisation is yet to be 
investigated. Therefore, this study contributes in filling this gap. With a balanced panel of 35 
African countries spanning 1990 to 2015, this study investigates the causal relationship among 
military expenditure, industrialisation, and economic growth. We employed Panel Vector Error 
Correction Model (PVECM) causality test. The findings suggest a long-run equilibrium 
relationship among our variables from the panel cointegration test. At both Africa and regional 
economic levels, the PVECM causality test suggests that industrialisation and growth causes 
military expenditure in the short-run and long-run. This implies that African governments fund 
military expenditure/activities largely by taxing production. Therefore, our results suggest that 
military spending can be used to achieve industrialisation and economic growth aimed at both the 
African continental level and at regional economic Africa communities.  
Keywords: Military Expenditure; Industrialisation; Economic Growth; Panel Causality; Africa. 
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1. Introduction 
Defence spending plays a key role in ensuring a country’s internal and external security. Apart 
from defence’s security benefits, it is also inclined to either enhance or retard economic growth 
(see Benoit, 1978; Dunne, Smith & Willenbockel, 2005; Kentor & Kick, 2008; Shahbaz, Afza & 
Shabbir, 2013). Military expenditure (henceforth, MILEX) is a vital segment in many African 
countries’ government expenditure budgets. Hence, the need for continuous implementation of 
adequate policy measures and reforms in order to ensure that the resources allocated to the defence 
sector assists in how it performs its functions. MILEX can impact the economy, majorly through 
demand supply, and security through it channels of transmission (Dunne & Uye, 2010; Coulomb 
& Bellais, 2008). According to the 2014 Stockholm International Peace Research Institute (SIPRI) 
report, Africa’s MILEX has increased by 91 per cent since 2005 despite a slight decrease of 5.3 
per cent in 2015. This is depicted in Figure 1.  Given the upward trend in MILEX, it is necessary 
to investigate whether or not it causes both industrialisation and economic growth in Africa, 
despite the fact that empirical literature since Benoit’s (1973, 1978) pioneer study has put forth 
different reasons why there is international demand for MILEX (see Batchelor, Dunne, & Lamb, 
2002; Goldsmith, 2003; Dunne, Perlo‐Freeman & Smith, 2008; Nikolaidou, 2008; Nordhaus, 
Oneal & Russett, 2012). 
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Figure 1: A graphical representation of Africa’s average military expenditure, Manufacturing share of GDP (proxy for 
industrialization) and real GDP from 1990 to 2015. Source: Author’s computation using data from the World Bank, SIPRI and 
UNIDO (2015). 
According to Wall Street and the World Bank, since 1995 Africa has experienced a steady increase 
in per capita income, and additionally the continent has the potential of becoming the developing 
world’s next “frontier market”. Yet since the independence of most African countries, the 
continental industrialisation experience has disappointed. This is also evident in the gradual 
downward trend of the manufacturing value added (MVA) share of the GDP over the study period. 
According to literature, the African countries’ inability to achieve industrialisation is due to: 
infrastructure bottlenecks (Newman, Page, Rand, Shimeles, Söderbom & Tarp, 2016; Dethier, 
2015; Noman & Stiglitz, 2015); insufficient productive capabilities (Bhorat, Steenkamp, Rooney, 
Kachingwe & Lees, 2016); the lack of skilled workers (Lawrence, 2005); underdeveloped financial 
markets (Kodongo & Ojah, 2016); and high levels of income inequality (Okojie & Shimeles, 
2006). 
The process of industrialisation is critical for any economy’s growth and development, and is 
considered important for mass production, providing employment opportunities, and realising the 
advantage of technological advancements, etc. Thus, industrialisation is considered to be the 
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engine of economic growth in an economy (Szirmai, 2012). Even though MILEX and 
industrialisation can promote economic growth, this may not be the case for every region of the 
world, which motivates an empirical investigation into the case of Africa. 
Theoretically, there is no agreement amongst economists on how MILEX impacts the economy. 
Different schools of thought identify different channels. Since there is no agreed theory among 
economists, various schools of thought have emerged to incorporate MILEX in economic growth 
appropriately (Dunne & Coulomb, 2008). These theories include: Neoclassical; Keynesian; 
Institutional; Marxist; and international perspectives, and enable researchers to identify various 
channels linking MILEX to economic growth. These different channels can be grouped into three 
broad classifications: demand; supply; and security. Interpreting Wagner’s law, Musgrave (1959) 
holds that as nations make progress in industrialisation, the size of the public sector increases 
steadily. He attributes this to the state’s increasing social, administrative/protective, and welfare 
functions. This law observes that there is a general tendency for public expenditure to increase 
steadily in most countries, and this drives economic growth. This law also predicts that as countries 
move towards industrialisation, this will be accompanied by an increasing share of public 
expenditure (which also includes defence spending) in the gross domestic product (GDP), due to 
revenue (tax) accrued from the economy’s industrial sector. 
Extensive research has been carried out, which provides evidence on the causality between 
MILEX, economic growth and other macroeconomic variables (Hirnissa, Habibullah & Baharom, 
2009; Destek (2016); Raza, Shahbaz, Paramati (2017) among others), but with mixed findings. 
However, to the best of our knowledge, no study has been carried out to investigate the causality 
among MILEX, industrialisation, and economic growth in Africa. In the light of this gap, this study 
contributes to the literature by using Panel Vector Error Correction Model (PVECM) causality 
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framework to investigate the causal relationships between MILEX, industrialisation, and economic 
growth in Africa. We used a balanced panel data spanning 1990 to 2015 for 35 African countries. 
Our data was further disaggregated to regional economic communities in African countriesi to 
further investigate the relationships at regional level.  
The rest of this study is structured as follows: section 2 provides a review of the literature; section 
3 presents the research methodology; section 4 presents the empirical results and discussion; and 
section 5 provides the conclusion and policy implications. 
2. Literature Review 
On the empirical side in general, recent studies like Jalil, Abbasi and Bibi (2016) investigates the 
long-run relationship between MILEX and economic growth for Pakistan and India using ARDL 
bounds testing approach. The study’s short-run results confirm that the MILEX can explain the 
per capita GDP in the short run and importantly, causality runs from MILEX to GDP.  Raza et al. 
(2017) study investigates the impact of MILEX on income inequality in Pakistan using data over 
the period of 1972-2012. The analysis of Granger causality, Toda-Yamamoto Modified Wald test 
and variance decomposition approaches confirm the presence of unidirectional causality running 
from MILEX to income inequality. While Nassani, Zaman, Aldakhil, & Abro (2017) examines the 
relationship between military factors and international tourism indicators in the panel of 18 tourists 
and non touristsoriented countries, over the period of 1995-2014. The study uses random effect 
model and generalized method of moments estimations. The results confirm the bidirectional 
causality between international tourism indicators and domestic investment (and healthcare 
expenditures), while there is a unidirectional causality running from international tourism 
expenditures to arms export, from tourism expenditures to military spending, and from tourism 
growth to per capita income. Khan, Zaman, Islam, Yousaf, Nassani, Khan, Mustaffa, Ahmad, 
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Hishan, and Aamir (2018) examines the nexus between military spending, business regulatory and 
growth. The results confirm the bidirectional causality between (i) income growth and military 
factors, and (ii) military growth and business factors. While it further validates the (i) business led 
MILEX, (ii) income led MILEX, and (iii) military led trade openness in a panel of G-7 countries. 
Destek (2016) analyses the asymmetric causality relationship between military spending and 
economic growth in a context of G-6 countries and confirms the negative shocks of military 
spending on country’s economic growth in the UK, France, and Germany, while neutrality 
hypothesis is supported in the remaining countries. Kollias, Paleologou, Tzeremes and Tzeremes 
(2017) explores the nexus between defence spending, economic growth, and investment for Latin 
American countries between 1961 and 2014 by employing both linear and nonlinear tests. Findings 
show that there is an absence of a strong and robust nexus between the variables examined. Kollias 
and Paleologou (2017) employs a panel vector autoregression (PVAR) to investigate the nexus 
between MILEX, investment spending and growth rates. It consists of 65 countries and covers the 
period 1971-2014 that allows for a total of 2730 observations. Findings from the study show that 
differences between the three income groups were unearthed by the empirical tests conducted. 
Churchill and Yew (2018) recent study on the previous empirical literature that examines the nexus 
between MILEX and economic growth used a sample of 272 meta-observations of studies drawn 
from 48 primary studies. Their study finds that existing studies indicate growth-retarding effects 
of MILEX. Results also shows that positive effects of MILEX on growth are more pronounced for 
developed countries than less developed countries.  
In conclusion, to the best our knowledge, the empirical studies have failed to investigate the causal 
relationships between MILEX, industrialisation, and economic growth in Africa. This study 
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investigates this very important aspect in order to understand the nature of causality between these 
three variables so as to inform policy direction. Hence, this study fills this the literature gap. 
3. Research Methodology  
In this study, the panel estimation technique consists of three processes: the panel unit root test; 
panel cointegration test; and panel heterogeneous granger-causality test. This study used the 
Augmented Dickey-Fuller (ADF) test using the Levine-Lin-Chu (LLC) method (Levin, Lin & 
Chin, 2002) and the Im-Pesaran-Shin (IPS) method (Im, Pesaran & Shin, 2003), and the Fisher-
PP and Breitung method (Breitung, 2001; Breitung & Das, 2005) to check the order of integration 
and to ascertain the variables’ stationarity level. We also used the Pedroni (1999, 2004) test of 
cointegration to establish the long-run relationship among the variables. To test for the cross-
sectional dependence (CD), the study used CD test proposed by Pesaran (2004) that allows for the 
cross-sectional independence among different cross-sectional units in a panel. The calculated value 
of CD statistic is reported in appendix 3 which shows an evidence of CD. Therefore, we proceed 
by applying Cross-Sectionally Augmented IPS (CIPS) test of Pesaran (2007) to take care of the 
problem. The results are also presented in appendix 4. 
3.1 Panel Causality Test 
The direction of causality between the panel variables is examined by performing the Engle and 
Granger (1987) test on the first-differenced variables. In order to capture the long-run 
relationships, an error correction term (ECM) is included in the VAR system. Equation (1 to 3) 
presents an augmented form of the Granger causality test in a multivariate VECM framework: 
∆ܴܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ߙଵ௜ ൅ ∑ ߠଵଵ௜௞௤௞ୀଵ ∆ܴܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ି௞ ൅ ∑ ߠଵଶ௜௞௤௞ୀଵ ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ି௞ ൅
																							∑ θଵଷ௜௞௤௞ୀଵ ∆ܯܫܮܧ ௜ܺ,௧ି௞ ൅ ߣଵܧܥ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߤଵ௜,௧		                                 (1) 
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 ∆ܯܫܮܧ ௜ܺ,௧ ൌ ߙଶ௜ ൅ ∑ ߠଶଵ௜௞௤௞ୀଵ ∆ܯܫܮܧ ௜ܺ,௧ି௞ ൅ ∑ ߠଶଶ௜௞௤௞ୀଵ ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ି௞ ൅
																											∑ ߠଶଷ௜௞௤௞ୀଵ ∆ܴܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ି௞ ൅ ߣଶܧܥ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߤଶ௜,௧			                          (2) 
∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ൌ ߙଷ௜ ൅ ∑ ߠଷଵ௜௞௤௞ୀଵ ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ି௞ ൅ ∑ ߠଷଶ௜௞௤௞ୀଵ ∆ܯܫܮܧ ௜ܺ,௧ି௞ ൅
																												∑ ߠଷଷ௜௞௤௞ୀଵ ∆ܴܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ି௞ ൅ ߣଷܧܥ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ ൅ ߤଷ௜,௧						                               (3) 
Where ܯܫܮܧܺ is military expenditure; ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ is the manufacturing value-added as 
percentage share of GDP (proxy for industrialisation); RGDP is the real GDP (proxy for economic 
growth); ∆ denotes the difference operator; ECT is the lagged error correction term derived from 
the long-run cointegrating relationship; ߙ௜, ߠ௜, and ߣ௜ are adjustment coefficients; k is the number 
of lags determined by the SIC (schwarz information criterion, the results is reported in appendix 
5) and ߤ௜ is the serially uncorrected error term. The variables are in logarithm form. The statistical 
significance of ܧܥ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ with a negative sign validates the existence of a long-run causality running 
among the variables. To investigate the short-run causality, the Wald test is applied.  
Table 1: Dataset 
Variables Indicator Source 
RGDP Real Gross domestic product. GDP at 
constant prices (constant 2010 US$) as a 
proxy for economic growth  
World Bank, 2015 
MANVGDP Manufacturing value added as a percentage 
share of the GDP (proxy for 
industrialization) 
United Nations Industrial Development 
Organization (UNIDO, 2015) 
MILEX Military Expenditure. Data in constant price 
(2014) US$ (millions) 
Stockholm International Peace Research 
Institute  (SIPRI, 2015) 
 
4. Empirical Results and Discussion 
The results are presented in this section. The structure includes: panel unit root; panel cointegration 
and regression test; and panel causality test. The results of the panel unit root tests from LLC, IPS, 
Fisher-ADF, Fisher-PP, and Breitung for the level and first differenced series of are reported in 
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Table 2. We conducted the test at: none; constant; constant and trend. We adopted different types 
of panel unit root tests in order to establish a strong order of integration. Overall, MILEX, 
MANVGDP (proxy for industrialisation) and RGDP were integrated of the same order. This 
further suggested the need for a cointegration test. 
Table 2: Panel unit root test results. 
Series Model LLC IPS Fisher-
ADF 
Fisher-PP Breitung 
Level       
MANVGDP None 2.129   26.712 27.067  
 Constant 0.168 1.047  53.543 54.074  
 Constant and trend -0.974 -0.551  72.125  64.2872 -0.943 
MILEX None  4.441  14.629 14.972  
 Constant 1.382 2.426 58.738 56.597  
 Constant and trend -1.508* -1.909** 95.026** 345.233*** 0.048 
RGDP None 16.163  2.219 1.401  
 Constant 1.117 9.816 11.239 9.452  
 Constant and trend -2.109*** -2.249**  98.929** 80.445 0.591 
First Difference       
∆MANVGDP None -19.295***  462.999*** 705.027***  
 Constant -11.217*** -13.157*** 303.994*** 519.748***  
 Constant and trend -8.569*** -10.598*** 236.441*** 618.191*** -10.398*** 
∆MILEX None -18.434***  447.801*** 695.772***  
 Constant -11.148*** -13.141*** 306.522*** 547.525***  
 Constant and trend -8.707*** -10.601*** 238.685*** 867.416*** -6.228*** 
∆RGDP None -6.233***  148.750*** 269.011***  
 Constant -8.127*** -10.262*** 238.336*** 426.205***  
 Constant and trend -5.599*** -7.172*** 173.638*** 409.776*** -5.483*** 
Notes: Null: Unit root (assumes common unit root process): Levin, Lin & Chu (t*) and Breitung (t-stat). Null: Unit root (assumes individual unit 
root process): Im, Pesaran and Shin (W-stat), ADF - Fisher (Chi-square) and PP-Fisher (Chi-square). *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1 are 
significance level respectively. Source: Author's computations, 2018. 
Table 3 shows the results of the panel cointegration from Pedroni’s seven statistics. They suggested 
rejection of the null of no cointegration at least at 10 per cent significance level for all the tests. It 
can therefore be concluded that MILEX, MANVGDP, and real GDP move together in the long-
run.  
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Table 3: Pedroni residual cointegration test results 
Methods/Variables Within dimension (panel)  Between dimension (Individuals) 
MANVGDP, MILEX, RGDP Test Statistics p-value  Test Statistics p-value 
Pedroni (1999) Panel v 15.562 0.000***  Group rho 2.293 0.989 
 Panel rho 1.846 0.968  Group PP -3.199 0.000*** 
 Panel PP -2.526 -0.006***  Group ADF -1.090 0.137 
 Panel ADF 1.902 0.971     
Pedroni (2004) (weighted statistics) Panel v 18.589 0.000***     
 Panel rho 2.017 0.978     
 Panel PP -1.534 0.062*     
 Panel ADF 1.027 0.848     
Note: Notes: The null hypothesis is that the variables are not cointegrated. Under the null hypothesis, all the statistics are distributed as standard 
normal distributions. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1 are significance level respectively. Source: Author's computations, 2018. 
 
Table 4 presents the results for both Africa and regional economic community members of African 
countries. For Africa, Table 4 displayed Chi-squared statistics for the joint significance of the 
model explanatory variables. As shown: (i) bidirectional causality between MILEX and RGDP; 
(ii) bidirectional causality between RGDP and MANVGDP; and (iii) unidirectional causality runs 
from MANVGDP to MILEX. The short-run causal relationships are conducted using the Wald 
test, from which the results suggest the following: (i) MANVGDP and MILEX Granger causes 
RGDP; (ii) MANVGDP and RGDP Granger causes MILEX; and (iii) RGDP Granger causes 
MANVGDP in the short-run. This means that in the short-run RGDP will be affected by 
industrialisation and military expenditure. While, insignificant coefficient of MILEX shows that 
MILEX does not influence industrialisation in the short-run but real GDP does. Additionally, 
MILEX and RGDP are the Granger causality for MANVGDP. In comparison, industrialisation 
and military expenditure jointly have a higher significant impact on economic growth (real GDP) 
in Africa.   
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Table 4. The of the Panel VECM Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests Analysis 
Results 
Dependent 
Variable 
VECM Granger Causality/Block Exogeneity Wald Tests  
 Variables Chi-square ܧܥ ௜ܶ,௧ିଵ 
Africa    
∆ܴܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 45.661*** 0.004** 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 7.679**  
                          All 56.414***  
∆ܯܫܮܧ ௜ܺ,௧ ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 30.085*** -0.039*** 
 ∆ܴܩܦܲ 5.337*  
                          All 34.437***  
∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 1.837 -0.063*** 
 ∆ܴܩܦܲ 34.059***  
                         All 35.262***  
AMU    
∆ܴܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 1.383 -0.008 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 13.086***  
                          All 13.362***  
∆ܯܫܮܧ ௜ܺ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 0.609 -0.066*** 
 ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 2.979  
                          All 3.507  
∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 3.712 -0.003 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 5.014*  
                          All 9.485*  
CEN-SAD   
∆ܴܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 1.496 -0.001 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 0.905  
                           All 2.553  
∆ܯܫܮܧ ௜ܺ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 2.859 -0.048*** 
 ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 18.525***  
                           All 29.339***  
∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 20.337*** 0.000 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 0.954  
                          All 21.295***  
COMESA    
∆ܴܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 4.447 0.014*** 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 1.608  
                          All 5.831  
∆ܯܫܮܧ ௜ܺ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 1.306 -0.026** 
 ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 7.469**  
                           All 8.675*  
∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 6.346** -0.1066*** 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 0.944  
                           All 6.601  
EAC    
∆ܴܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 1.221 0.0733*** 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 2.113  
                           All 3.160  
∆ܯܫܮܧ ௜ܺ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 7.503** -0.145**** 
 ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 0.869  
                           All 8.042*  
∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 1.743 -0.0484** 
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 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 0.562  
                          All 1.834  
ECCAS    
∆ܴܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 2.889 0.020 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 1.168  
                           All 4.321  
∆ܯܫܮܧ ௜ܺ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 4.739* -0.232*** 
 ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 3.329  
                          All 8.098*  
∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 4.409 -0.066 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 0.462  
                          All 4.734  
ECOWAS    
∆ܴܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 0.541 0.002 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 10.708***  
                          All 11.128**  
∆ܯܫܮܧ ௜ܺ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 0.439 -0.060*** 
 ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 3.789  
                          All 4.639  
∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 1.553 0.001 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 1.756  
                          All 3.512  
IGAD    
∆ܴܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 9.298*** 0.013*** 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 2.473  
                          All 9.913**  
∆ܯܫܮܧ ௜ܺ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 0.802 -0.066* 
 ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 11.291***  
                          All 11.912**  
∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 8.681** -0.103*** 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 0.573  
                          All 9.091*  
SADC    
∆ܴܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 17.106*** 0.004 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 2.296  
                           All 22.271***  
∆ܯܫܮܧ ௜ܺ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 3.920 -0.109*** 
 ∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦܲ 21.297***  
                           All 28.287***  
∆ܯܣܸܰܩܦ ௜ܲ,௧ ∆ܴܩܦܲ 3.811 -0.071*** 
 ∆ܯܫܮܧܺ 5.113*  
                          All 6.367  
Note:. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1. Economic region: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); 
Common Market for Eastern and Southern Africa (COMESA); East African Community (EAC); The Economic Community of Central African 
States (ECCAS); Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Southern 
African Development Community (SADC). Author’s Computation, 2018. 
 
Furthermore, Table 4 represents the results and long-run causality relationships among the 
variables at Africa level. In long-run when ∆ܯܫܮܧ ௜ܺ,௧ିଵ is used by way of dependent variable, the 
coefficient of lagged ECT is negative and significant which shows that MILEX has a coverage 
tendency to its long-run equilibrium in response to changes in its regressors. The negative ECT 
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and its statistical significance shows that there is a long-run Granger causality running from: (i) 
MANVGDP and RGDP to MILEX; and (ii) MILEX and RGDP to MANVGDP. The bidirectional 
causality between MILEX and RGDP means that a rise (fall) in the level of MILEX causes a 
corresponding fall (rise) in RGDP in Africa (this result was consistent with the findings of Lai, 
Huang and Yang (2005), Kollias et al. (2004) and Tiwari and Shahbaz (2013)). This implies that 
African governments fund military/defense activities from taxing production and this has a 
corresponding significant positive return on production in the short-run. Bidirectional causality 
between RGDP and MANVGDP is in line with the economic theory and this implies that a rise 
(fall) in the MANVGDP causes a corresponding rise (fall) in RGDP. The fact that military 
expenditure does not cause industrialisation implies that African governments finance the defense 
sector partly from the dividend of industrialisation. Even though African countries are still in the 
process of industrialisation. 
We disaggregated our data to regional economic communities in African countries to further 
investigate the causal relationships among our variables. Regional economic-by-economic 
community analyses revealed short-run unidirectional causality running from: (i) growth to 
industrialisation in CEN-SAD and COMESA; (ii) I ndustrialisation to MILEX in CEN-SAD, 
COMESA, IGAD and SADC; (iii) MILEX to growth in ECOWAS and AMU; (iv) MILEX to 
industrialisation in AMU; (v) growth to MILEX in EAC and ECCAS; and (vi) industrialisation to 
growth in SADC. There is bidirectional causality between: (i) industrialisation and growth in the 
short-run in IGAD; and (ii) industrialisation and MILEX in SADC. While no short-run causality 
runs between: (i) growth and MILEX, in CEN-SAD, COMESA, IGAD and SADC; (ii) 
industrialisation and growth in AMU, EAC, ECCAS and ECOWAS; and (iii) industrialisation and 
MILEX in EAC, ECCAS and ECOWAS. Furthermore, in AMU, CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, 
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ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC there is a long-run Granger causality running from growth 
and industrialisation to MILEX.  
The above results imply that in the short-run: (i) a rise (fall) in the growth causes a rise (fall) in 
industrialisation in CEN-SAD and COMESA; (ii) a rise (fall) in industrialisation causes a rise (fall) 
in MILEX in CEN-SAD, COMESA, IGAD and SADC; (iii) a rise (fall) in the MILEX causes a 
rise (fall) in growth in ECOWAS and AMU; (iv) a rise (fall) in the MILEX causes a rise (fall) in 
industrialisation in AMU; (v) a rise (fall) in the growth causes a rise (fall) in MILEX in EAC and 
ECCAS (this is consistent with Kalyoncu and Yucel (2006), Gokmenoglu et al. (2015), and Korhan 
et al.’s (2015) findings); (vi) a rise (fall) in the industrialisation causes a rise (fall) in growth in 
SADC; (vii)  a rise (fall) in the MILEX causes a corresponding rise (fall) industrialisation in IGAD; 
(viii) a rise (fall) in the MILEX causes a corresponding rise (fall) in industrialisation in SADC; 
(ix) a rise (fall) in MILEX does not cause a corresponding rise (fall) in growth in CEN-SAD, 
COMESA, IGAD and SADC; (x) a rise (fall) in industrialisation does not cause a corresponding 
rise (fall) in growth in AMU, EAC, ECCAS and ECOWAS; (xi) a rise (fall) in industrialisation 
does not cause a corresponding rise (fall) in MILEX in EAC, ECCAS and ECOWAS. While in the 
long-run a rise (fall) in growth and industrialisation causes a corresponding rise (fall) in MILEX 
in AMU, CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC. In regions such as 
COMESA, EAC, IGAD and SADC, growth and MILEX Granger causes industrialisation long-
run.  
From the empirical results, MILEX plays a significant role in causing both industrialisation and 
economic growth in the regional economic communities of member states. This can be linked to 
each region’s possible common objectives, which are to; (i) promote peace, security, and stability 
within, and good neighborliness among the partner states; (ii) resolve disputes peacefully; and (iii) 
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to ensure close defence cooperation and establish a Memorandum of Understanding (MOU) in 
defence (UNECA, 2018). These objectives have led to joint military cooperation in order to: 
combat terrorism and piracy; support peace operations; prevent genocide; manage crises, disasters, 
and refugees; control the proliferation of small arms and light weapons; and combat transnational 
and cross-border crimes. The member states consider strengthening and intensifying military 
cooperation to be a vital approach towards promoting economic growth and development, through 
consolidated peace and security. 
5. Conclusion and Policy Implications 
Considerable analysis has focused on the causal relationship between MILEX and economic 
growth in the empirical literature. However, the causal link to industrialisation is yet to be 
investigated. Therefore, this study contributes in filling this gap. With a balanced panel of 35 
African countries spanning 1990 to 2015, this study investigated the causal relationship among 
MILEX, industrialisation, and economic growth. We employed: a panel unit root test; panel 
cointegration test; and Panel Vector Error Correction Model (PVECM) causality test. The results 
of the panel cointegration analysis provided evidence of long-run relationship among our variables. 
The PVECM Granger causality results for Africa suggested that: (i) industrialisation and MILEX 
Granger causes growth; (ii) industrialisation and growth Granger causes MILEX; and (iii) growth 
Granger causes industrialisation in the short-run. The long-run Granger causality runs from: (i) 
industrialisation and growth to MILEX; and (ii) MILEX and growth to industrialisation. 
Regional economic-by-economic community analyses revealed short-run unidirectional causality 
running from: (i) growth to industrialisation in CEN-SAD and COMESA; (ii) industrialisation to 
MILEX in CEN-SAD, COMESA, IGAD and SADC; (iii) MILEX to growth in ECOWAS and 
AMU; (iv) MILEX to industrialisation in AMU; (v) growth to MILEX in EAC and ECCAS; and 
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(vi) industrialisation to growth in SADC. There is bidirectional causality between: (i) 
industrialisation and growth in the short-run in IGAD; and (ii) industrialisation and MILEX in 
SADC. While no short-run causality runs between: (i) growth and MILEX, in CEN-SAD, 
COMESA, IGAD and SADC; (ii) industrialisation and growth in AMU, EAC, ECCAS and 
ECOWAS; and (iii) industrialisation and MILEX in EAC, ECCAS and ECOWAS. Furthermore, 
in AMU, CEN-SAD, COMESA, EAC, ECCAS, ECOWAS, IGAD and SADC there is a long-run 
Granger causality running from growth and industrialisation to MILEX. 
The findings from the short-run causality imply that: (i) in regions with no causal relationship 
between industrialisation and real GDP, industrialisation policy objectives can be pursued 
independently from growth policy objectives, and defence policy objectives independently from 
industrialisation policy objectives; (ii) the fact that industrialisation causes MILEX, and not vice 
versa, implies that defence decisions are not made in a manner that promotes industrialisation; (iii) 
regions that effectively use MILEX for their industrialisation aims, hence MILEX causes 
industrialisation; (iv) in regions where economic growth causes both MILEX and industrialisation 
implies that economic growth policy objectives can be used to achieve both MILEX and 
industrialisation objectives in these regions; and (v) variables with bidirectional causality implies 
that both decisions of the variables are dependent in the regions that fall under this category. The 
causality running from industrialisation and growth to MILEX in the long-run analysis at both 
Africa and regional levels implies that regional African governments fund military activities 
largely by taxing production, and the lack of feedback implies no positive returns on production.  
Thus, our results suggest that MILEX can be used to achieve industrialisation and economic 
growth aims at both the Africa level and in regional economic African communities both in the 
short-run and long-run. Regional African governments can further synergise and implement 
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defence, industrialisation, and economic growth policy objectives together with their aim of 
placing Africa at the forefront of a well-secured economy both in the short-run and long-run.  
However, it should be noted that this paper is limited due to the unavailability of reliable data on 
employment in the manufacturing sector. Future research can consider the causal relationship 
between disaggregated MILEX, industrialisation, and economic growth for both developed and 
developing countries.  
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Appendices: 
Appendix 1 
Table 6: List of Selected African Countries 
                                                                               Countries 
Algeria Burundi Ethiopia Madagascar Morocco Seychelles Togo 
Angola Cameroon Gambia Malawi Mozambique Sierra Leone Tunisia 
Benin Chad Ghana Mali Nigeria South Africa Uganda 
Botswana Côte d’Ivoire Kenya Mauritania Rwanda Sudan Zambia 
Burkina Faso Egypt Lesotho Mauritius Senegal Swaziland Zimbabwe 
 
 
Appendix 2 
Table 7: Africa’s Regional Economic Blocks 
Africa’s Regional Economic Blocks  Year 
Formed 
Member Countries for this study 
Arab Maghreb Union (AMU) 1989 Algeria, Mauritania, Morocco, and Tunisia. 
Community of Sahel-Saharan States 
(CEN-SAD) 
1998 Benin, Burkina Faso, Chad, Côte d’Ivoire, Egypt, 
Gambia, Ghana, Mali, Mauritania, Morocco, 
Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone, Sudan, Togo and 
Tunisia. 
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Common Market for Eastern and 
Southern Africa (COMESA)  
1994 Burundi, Egypt, Ethiopia, Kenya, Madagascar, 
Malawi, Mauritius, Rwanda, Sudan, Seychelles, 
Uganda, Zambia and Zimbabwe 
East African Community (EAC) 1999 Burundi, Kenya, Rwanda and Uganda  
The Economic Community of Central 
African States (ECCAS)  
1983 Angola, Burundi, Cameroon, Chad and Rwanda  
Economic Community of West 
African States (ECOWAS) 
1975 Benin, Burkina Faso, Côte d’Ivoire, Gambia, Ghana, 
Mali, Nigeria, Senegal, Sierra Leone and Togo. 
Intergovernmental Authority on 
Development (IGAD) 
1996 Ethiopia, Kenya, Sudan and Uganda. 
Southern African Development 
Community (SADC) 
1992 Angola, Botswana, Lesotho, Madagascar, Malawi, 
Mauritius, Mozambique, Seychelles, South Africa, 
Zambia and Zimbabwe. 
 
Appendix 3 
Table 8: Pesaran Cross-Sectional Independence Test Results 
Pesaran's CD test 
  123.886 (0.0000) 
Note: *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, and * p<0.1 are significance level respectively 
Appendix 4 
Table 9: Pesaran (2007) CIPS Results 
Variable At levels  At first difference  
 Constant Constant and 
trend 
Constant Constant and 
trend 
MANVGDP -2.173 -2.269 -4.685*** -4.817*** 
MILEX -2.458 -2.334 -4.590*** -4.771*** 
RGDP -1.688 -1.896 -4.128*** -4.348*** 
Note: ***, ** and * denotes rejection of the null hypothesis of non-stationary at 1, 5 and 10 % levels of significance 
respectively 
 
Appendix 5 
Table 10: Optimum Lag Length Selection Results 
VAR lag order selection criteria. 
Exogenous variables: C. 
Endogenous variables: MANVGDP MILEX RGDP 
Lag FPE AIC SIC HIC 
0 0.377059 7.538 7.557 7.546 
1 4.23E-06 -3.860 -3.785 -3.831 
2 3.52E-06 -4.044  -3.913*  -3.994* 
3 3.50E-06 -4.048 -3.860 -3.975 
4 3.41E-06 -4.075 -3.832 -3.982 
5   3.39e-06*  -4.080* -3.779 -3.964 
*Indicates lag order selected by the criterion. FPE: Final prediction error. AIC: Akaike Information Criterion. SIC: Schwarz Information 
criterion. HQIC: Hannan-Quinn Information Criterion. 
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i The Economic regions includes: Arab Maghreb Union (AMU); Community of Sahel-Saharan States (CEN-SAD); Common Market for Eastern 
and Southern Africa (COMESA); East African Community (EAC); The Economic Community of Central African States (ECCAS); Economic 
Community of West African States (ECOWAS); Intergovernmental Authority on Development (IGAD); Southern African Development 
Community (SADC). 
                                                            
